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In the 2010s, major US initiatives framed urban retrofitting as a decarbonization solution. These programs 
address an obtrusive legacy of industrial capitalism: its built environments shed energy and emissions 
when they fall into disrepair. Political ecology and economy have been slow to engage retrofitting, an 
absence that is conspicuous as these fields take on planetary repair as a conceptual provocation and turn 
in mainstream conservation. This paper explores US retrofitting as a distinctive material repair practice, 
one born as an energy poverty program amid the scarcity fears of the 1970s Energy Crisis but seeing a 
renaissance today as a program for green capitalist growth. I interrogate two economies of repair now 
emerging around retrofitting, energy market and cleantech aspirations to make energy efficiency a 
resource and articulated efforts to sell retrofits as new green value for real estate development and 
investment. Such urban revaluation efforts join an expanding array of green gentrification schemes today. 
Paradoxically, even as would-be green entrepreneurs are drawn to these seemingly intangible and “clean” 
forms of waste and value-in-waiting, retrofitting presents intransigent materialities. Its decarbonization 
ambitions demand not just profit-generating urban repair today but large-scale urban maintenance into the 
future. This need confronts longstanding efforts to render US cities and built environments flexible to 
recurrent creative destruction in service of ongoing economic growth. Such logics of de/revaluation and 
essential disposability permit concurrent US programs for gentrification and urban abandonment today. 
However, decarbonization requires a more substantial confrontation with capitalist ruination-as-usual. 
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In the 2010s, major US initiatives framed urban retrofitting as a decarbonization solution. These programs 
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when they fall into disrepair. Political ecology and economy have been slow to engage retrofitting, an 
absence that is conspicuous as these fields take on planetary repair as a conceptual provocation and turn 
in mainstream conservation. This paper explores US retrofitting as a distinctive material repair practice, 
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Paradoxically, even as would-be green entrepreneurs are drawn to these seemingly intangible and “clean” 
forms of waste and value-in-waiting, retrofitting presents intransigent materialities. Its decarbonization 
ambitions demand not just profit-generating urban repair today but large-scale urban maintenance into the 
future. This need confronts longstanding efforts to render US cities and built environments flexible to 
recurrent creative destruction in service of ongoing economic growth. Such logics of de/revaluation and 
essential disposability permit concurrent US programs for gentrification and urban abandonment today. 
However, decarbonization requires a more substantial confrontation with capitalist ruination-as-usual. 
 
  
In the 2010s, climate change became an urban problem in a new way. In the United States, major 
cities announced sweeping projects of urban retrofitting in the name of energy conservation and 
decarbonization. Initiatives such as New York City’s PlaNYC, Los Angeles’ Sustainable pLAn, 
and Chicago’s Retrofit Chicago promised to repair and modernize broad swathes of their existing 
built environments for improved energy efficiency, substantially reduce citywide energy use, and 
slash greenhouse gas emissions.1 Meanwhile, state legislation such as California’s Assembly Bill 
758 and Senate Bill 350 targeted existing buildings in and beyond cities, in California’s case 
ambitiously committing the state to double its energy efficiency by 2030. Together, such energy 
retrofitting programs in the United States, alongside similar efforts in Europe and other older 
industrial economies, are shaping an important problem space, and space of imagined solutions, 
for climate response. Namely, in taking on such places’ existing built environments and energy 
practices, they prioritize these second natures “at home” – problem-location that has often eluded 
a global carbon economy of emissions trading, offsetting, and other geographical displacements 
to rural and exploitable spaces.2 Moreover, they diverge from the green master planning visions 
of new eco-cities. Retrofitting takes on capitalist ruin/s more directly and intimately. Centrally, it 
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confronts an increasingly obtrusive legacy of 20th century industrialism: that its built 
environments, constructed with the assumption of cheap and abundant fossil energy, chronically 
bleed energy and emissions when they fall into disrepair. 
 
Political ecology has been slow to engage climate retrofitting as a movement and practice 
(Edwards and Bulkeley 2015, Knuth 2016),3 even as retrofitting provokes new critical analysis 
amid broader debates on Anthropocene urbanism and resilience (e.g., Hodson and Marvin 2015, 
Hodson et al. 2016, Cohen 2017, Bouzarovski et al. 2018, and see Derickson 2018, Long and 
Rice 2018). This absence is conspicuous as political ecologists take on planetary repair more 
expansively, as a conceptual provocation for an era of global environmental destabilization and 
as a conflictual turn in mainstream conservation practice – particularly as technofuturist visions 
of ecological design and geoengineering gain new adherents (e.g., Latour 2011, Robbins and 
Moore 2013, Collard et al. 2015, Tsing 2015, Mansfield and Doyle 2017). Despite urban 
political ecology’s longstanding commitment to “renaturalizing” cities, urban second natures 
have often been sidelined in debates on repair’s political future.4 Moreover, urban buildings and 
interior environments have been marginal concerns for a subfield preoccupied with more visibly 
“green” urban ecologies and networked infrastructures (although see Day Biehler and Simon 
2011, Knuth 2016, Cohen 2017, Wachsmuth and Angelo 2018).5 In this paper, I make a new 
intervention in these discussions. First, I explore energy (/decarbonization) retrofitting as a 
distinctive practice of material repair. Its sociomaterial assemblages remain geographically 
particular in important ways, shaped by divergent regional histories of urbanization, energy-
technological modernization, disinvestment, and degradation – as well as meaningful 
climatological and vernacular architectural difference. Therefore, I ground this paper’s survey in 
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a specific US experience of energy retrofitting, one born in the complex political moment of the 
1970s Energy Crisis. This period’s brief but influential brush with energy scarcity and 
conservation thinking inflected welfare programs such as weatherization (in an often-buried 
history of energy poverty in the United States), countercultural imaginaries of alternative energy 
futures, and urban redevelopment and rehabilitation struggles – all significant in retrofitting’s 
evolving politics, then and now. 
 
More centrally, I consider what retrofitting is becoming. Like other prominent programs of 
environmental repair and restoration/redesign today, energy retrofitting is being positioned in 
today’s US initiatives as at once a decarbonization strategy, frontier for green innovation and 
entrepreneurialism, and prop to capitalist accumulation-as-usual. Political ecologists increasingly 
critique repair and restoration’s place in such green growth visions (e.g., Goldstein 2014, 
Mansfield and Doyle 2017). Fairhead et al. (2012) persuasively argue that “the damage inflicted 
by economic growth generating unsustainable resource thus creates the basis for the new growth 
economy of repair” in which “unsustainable use ‘here’ can be repaired by sustainable practices 
‘there’, with one nature subordinated to the other” (p. 241). They argue that this interplay results 
in “doubly valuing nature: for its use and for its repair…in such a way as to maximise both 
economies – of growth and of repair – with the intent of getting the very most out of nature and 
with maximum efficiency” (p. 242). If retrofitting brings Fairhead et al.’s “economy of repair” 
home in noteworthy ways, it simultaneously reignites longstanding questions about energy 
efficiency’s ability to achieve energy conservation. Like Fairhead et al., skeptics have long 
argued that such interventions may trim energy “waste” while accommodating – and even 
promoting – growing energy use. Political ecology, with often-allied degrowth advocacy 
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(D’Alisa et al. 2014), must therefore explore whether energy retrofitting offers more durable 
decarbonization possibilities despite today’s green growth aspirations – and, if so, with what 
obstacles and delimitations. 
 
In this paper, I therefore examine two particular economies of repair now emerging around 
energy retrofitting in the United States.6 I survey material visions, value propositions, and 
valuation efforts in these developing green sectors – thereby advancing new insights into value in 
green capitalism, a theoretical project now spanning political ecology, political economy, and 
cultural economy (e.g., Kenney-Lazar and Kay 2017, Knuth 2017). First, I explore how 
retrofitting has been taken up by a wave of energy efficiency entrepreneurs, furthering market-
led transformation and turbulence in the US electric power system. New accumulation visions 
propose “energy efficiency as a resource”, value that can be profitably cultivated or mined within 
existing buildings (and see Knuth 2016). Such aspirations have drawn both major corporate 
players and “cleantech” start-ups to the sector. Together, they are shaping an important frontier 
within the green economy’s broader waste to resource program (Gregson et al. 2010, 2016, 
Knapp 2016) – one with a distinctive (im)material bent. Second, I draw on urban political 
economy to consider the property sector that shapes these built environments, and the prospects 
for realizing many such green capitalist hopes. A parallel accumulation project is now 
developing among real estate developers, investors, would-be green financial innovators, and 
entrepreneurial urban governments. These players are working to translate energy retrofitting and 
value-added into an instrument for real estate conversion, revaluation, and speculation; for 
example, in drives to appraise and certify a green value premium for retrofitted properties, and to 
enlist future energy savings as a new revenue stream for financing building adaptive reuse. These 
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revaluation efforts join an expanding set of green gentrification schemes today, a growing 
concern of urban political ecology and economy. Meanwhile, historic preservation players and 
other institutions with a stake in the United States’ legacy built environments are generating new 
energy and emissions data to sell retrofitting – an exercise with unexpected radical potential. 
 
With this first-cut survey, I draw out a central paradox of retrofitting initiatives’ vision for 
decarbonization and/as green growth. Would-be green entrepreneurs have been drawn by the 
intangible form of urban-industrial waste, energy and emissions inefficiency, that retrofitting 
projects target as value- and resource-in-waiting: significantly, an attractively “clean” and 
malleable one compared to the frequently intractable, abject, and risky materialities of industrial 
byproducts, urban discards, and contaminated brownfield land (Gregson et al. 2010, 2016, 
Gidwani and Reddy 2011, Dillon 2014). Meanwhile, it offers US cleantech players enticing 
opportunities for light-footprint business models in green services, information technology, and 
financing – an important departure from the material- and capital-intensive manufacturing that 
frustrated the sector in the late 2000s (Knuth 2018). More fundamentally, it suggests an 
important accumulation frontier for economic decoupling, ecological modernization’s central 
proposition that an innovative capitalism can detach growth from its energy and material 
metabolisms. This proposal requires (again, necessary but far from sufficient) the successful 
production of such intangible value forms, assets, and economic spaces. Indeed, I suggest that 
early US countercultural experiments with energy efficiency helped make green growth 
imaginable. However, I argue that in practice, retrofitting initiatives confront Fairhead et al.’s 
critique in a particularly wicked form. In their ineluctable material dependence upon urban built 
environments and capitalist urban interests, they enter a space hostile to their deeper 
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decarbonization goals – and possibly even the more delimited aspirations of their green capitalist 
adherents. As a decarbonization strategy, retrofitting requires not just potentially profitable urban 
repair today but large-scale urban maintenance into the future – a far more demanding challenge 
to capitalist ruination. 
 
 
Retrofitting’s Roots: Weatherization and the Specter of Energy Scarcity 
The Energy Crisis of the 1970s was a generative moment in US politics, in ways immediately 
apparent and in ways only being realized or remembered today. In recent work, Huber (2013) 
has tracked the influence of this jarring encounter with energy scarcity in the crisis of US 
Keynesianism, the rise of neoliberalism, and the birth of a new era of US oil adventurism and 
imperialism abroad. Domestically, the Energy Crisis influenced a broad set of contemporary 
debates, in ways farther-reaching than new questions about oil abundance and automobility. As I 
will discuss below, concerns for energy waste and conservation inflected the era’s politics in 
spheres as diverse as electric utility politics, urban redevelopment protests, and the rise of 
historic preservation. However, the Energy Crisis’s arguably most direct influence on the 
development of energy retrofitting was in the birth of the US Weatherization Assistance Program 
in 1976 (and see Harrison and Popke 2011). In low-income weatherization, ultimately funded 
through both the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), the federal government has for decades paid for home energy efficiency audits 
and repairs for improved energy performance, with eligibility requirements that target low-
income households – who, even in the energy-rich United States, continue to spend a 
disproportionate amount of their income on basic energy uses (Berry et al. 1997). The Energy 
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Crisis provided a crucial spark for weatherization efforts, as spikes in the costs of home heating 
oil compounded existing consumer strains like stagflation. However, the program speaks to more 
fundamental tensions in the spaces of high-energy capitalism. 
 
Crucially, weatherization programs problematized, if tacitly, the built environments and 
embedded energy practices of previous generations: the United States’ variety of industrial 
capitalism was in crucial ways generated through dedicated campaigns for urban redevelopment 
and building energy-technological modernization. Electric utilities, manufacturing corporations, 
and interested policymakers sought deliberately to promote unprecedented levels of energy 
consumption society-wide, and ways of everyday life organized around it (Nye 1992, Hirsh 
1999). This mission required a broader revolution in building design, in programs initiated in the 
1920s and expanded through the New Deal-Keynesian era – for example, the public-private 
campaign to produce the suburban “minimum home” and its electric appliance suite (Hise 1999). 
Moreover, it required a large-scale program for energy retrofitting, parallel public-private drives 
to modernize existing built environments for the new high(er)-energy capitalism – for example, 
New Deal programs to rewire older homes for full electrification (Tobey 1996). Such built 
environments now subsume high levels of energy use within taken-for-granted practices, 
obdurate materialities (Hommels 2005), and normalized assumptions – a process of rendering-
inconspicuous that shapes energy consumption in stubborn ways (Walker and Large 1974, Shove 
2003). Particularly challenging to energy conservation efforts, the spread of central heating and 
then air conditioning created rising expectations of atmospheric control and comfort within a 
vast and growing interior environment. This second nature now spans diverse climatic regions 
across the United States, and has spawned an array of building designs and settlement 
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geographies marginally habitable without high energy consumption (although many energy-poor 
people are nonetheless required to do so). Resultant heating and cooling loads now dominate 
energy use in US buildings, particularly housing (DOE 2008).7 Omnipresent but for many 
invisible or involuntary, such materialities present broader challenges to campaigns for energy 
conservation and decarbonization. 
 
Weatherization confronted such high-energy spaces and geographies as a problem in a novel way 
– a source of vulnerability should energy subsequently become scarce or unaffordable. In 
response, the program pioneered practices of repair that continue to characterize many energy 
retrofitting initiatives. Notably, it centrally problematizes how buildings can waste energy. This 
focus does not wholly capture the many ways in which people or economic sectors may 
metabolize high-quality energy, “wastefully” or not (for example, through the introduction of 
new energy-using devices and their infrastructures). However, it turns a practical lens on 
buildings’ vital materialities and sociomaterial assemblages (Bennett 2009, McFarlane 2011, and 
see Gieryn 2002, Graham and Thrift 2007).8 Like all earth surface structures, buildings 
materially break down over time due to weathering and entropic processes, including biological 
ones (Day Biehler and Simon 2011) – dissolution that requires ongoing human maintenance 
interventions to slow and reverse. Meanwhile, products of a sociotechnically volatile capitalism, 
buildings frequently crystallize designs, technologies, and construction techniques that 
subsequent innovations render obsolescent – suboptimally efficient to operate in energy terms, as 
well as merely unfashionable (and see Weber 2002, Abramson 2016).9 Degradation of building 
shells due to weathering and undermaintenace renders their interior natures permeable to 
surrounding environmental fluxes, leaking warm air out (or hot air and moisture in), 
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compromising inhabitants’ comfort and health, and demanding ever-increasing amounts of 
energy to effectively heat or cool.10 Meanwhile, physical plant technologies such as heating 
systems and boilers wear out over time or are technologically superseded. Weatherization, like 
energy retrofitting more generally today, has thus sought to reduce building energy waste 
through a combination of repair (locating and patching leaks, fixing building elements like 
outside doors and windows) and technological modernization (replacing appliances like electric 
lights and refrigerators and larger physical plant elements like heating systems, updating building 
shell technologies such as improved wall or attic insulation, and so forth). 
 
More immediately, weatherization efforts have been an acknowledgement, albeit fleeting and 
quickly marginalized, that energy scarcity remains a reality for many in the United States via 
unaffordability. A recurring theme in this persistent energy poverty is unequal exposure to 
disrepair and obsolescence in habitation and other everyday built spaces (Harrison and Popke 
2011). This inequality takes multifarious forms in the United States (within a broader global 
geography, e.g., Silver 2016). The poor often inherit older, undermaintained buildings. 
Paradoxically, this process is lionized in longstanding mainstream discourses of “filtering”, 
housing affordability via trickle-down (critiqued in Slater 2017). Alternatively, they may rely on 
habitation not built to last (see Harrison and Popke on the problems of weatherizing US mobile 
homes) or, as renters, endure landlords’ causal or strategic building neglect (Smith 1979). 
Moreover, notwithstanding important histories of sweat equity in building and neighborhood 
rehabilitation (e.g., Kinder 2016) such households also have unequal access to the means of 
repair, including through legacies of racialized redlining and broader financial exclusion. In 
important ways, therefore, federal weatherization has operated both as an energy conservation 
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program (the primary remit of its DOE funders) and a form of government economic 
redistribution (DHHS’s priority, alongside direct energy bill aid and other social welfare 
programs). However, such redistributive power has been chronically limited in practice. Moving 
out of the Energy Crisis, fossil fuel interests and US society writ large clamored for a return to 
high energy growth, rejecting calls for broad-based energy conservation. Meanwhile, a rising 
neoliberalism began to pick off and undermine Keynesian welfare programs. Low-income 
weatherization, objectionable on both counts and dependent upon Congressional appropriations, 
has suffered chronically limited resources for decades – and, periodically, the threat of complete 
defunding (Berry et al. 1997, Tonn et al. 2011).11 
 
Despite its resource restrictions, low-income weatherization has been a noteworthy example of 
long-term energy conservation policy – and, as such, raises important questions. Governmental 
assessments of the program argue that it achieves substantial energy savings for its participants 
(e.g., Tobey et al. 2011). These assessments provide important support for retrofitting’s energy 
conservation potential (if not a final word, as such claims face ongoing questioning and speak in 
any case to a subset of retrofitting’s potential clients). Critics often invoke a longer-term debate 
around energy efficiency, the problem of the “Jevons Paradox” (or a “rebound effect”). Derived 
from William Stanley Jevons’ observations on coal-mining in the early Industrial Revolution, 
this economic model suggests that as efficiency improvements cheapen energy use, they simply 
encourage more energy use – prompting energy efficiency and consumption to grow together. 
This possibility presented scant challenge to earlier US energy efficiency advocacy, as Taylorists 
and Technocrats in the Progressive Era actively pursued efficiency-led industrial growth – a 
durable waste-trimming logic in industrial ecology. However, it is a central concern for eco-
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efficiency hopes today, for both decarbonization and green capitalism (as seen in Fairhead et 
al.’s 2012 related critique). Nonetheless, in retrofitting’s case, the Jevons Paradox is a simplistic 
gloss on complex sociomaterial relations. It is by no means obvious that recipients will pour 
energy cost savings from repair projects back into intensified energy usage – or even into 
broader consumer spending, although weatherization programs may invoke such Keynesian 
growth benefits. As energy retrofitting programs multiply and become more expansive, these 
questions demand ongoing scrutiny.  
 
 
Retrofitting for Green Growth: Emerging Economies of Repair 
Writing during the Energy Crisis, Walker and Large (1974) outlined a more serious problem of 
energy conservation: that given US structural dependence (including through its built 
environments) on high energy consumption and/for ongoing economic growth, its proposition 
was rather more radical than advocates perhaps appreciated. Framed in a language of scarcity, 
conservation might be (barely) tolerated as a marginal program for the poor, but faced fierce 
resistance as a large-scale social undertaking. Unsurprisingly, therefore, today’s renaissance in 
energy retrofitting has been accompanied and enabled by a profound shift in how it is imagined: 
instead of project of scarcity, it is now being framed as an opportunity for economic growth. The 
new retrofitting in many ways embodies a central proposition of market environmentalism: to 
use novel (re)valuation schemes and markets to turn problems like the US’s high energy and 
emissions footprint on their heads, framing them instead as untapped resource frontiers. In the 
process, retrofitting’s public and private advocates are targeting new populations, built 
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environments, and sectors as accumulation opportunities. I consider two such emerging 
economies here. 
 
Energy Efficiency as a Resource: Retrofitting and Energy Market Transformation 
First, one key proposition driving new private sector interest in retrofitting comes from a 
growing array of schemes to reframe energy efficiency as a resource – a key frontier in broader 
market-led transformation within the US electric power system. Like weatherization, these 
energy market schemes have deeper roots in the 1970s Energy Crisis. As the period’s rising 
prices and scarcity fears shook US high-energy assumptions, they further destabilized a national 
energy paradigm already experiencing challenges from within and without: the US electric utility 
system, and particularly its modernist “grow and build” model. For decades, investor-owned 
utilities commanding state-granted “natural monopolies” had captured increasing economies of 
scale from ongoing expansions in their customer base and electric services consumed, load 
balancing across the power grid, and rising thermodynamic efficiencies within increasingly large 
generation plants (Hirsh 1999). By the 1970s, the material and political bases of this growth were 
breaking down. Amid environmentalist challenges and rising interest in alternative energy, 
technologists and activist energy regulators began to experiment with new ways to encode 
energy efficiency and conservation into utility sector business models. National labs investigated 
designs for high-efficiency lightbulbs and other consumer appliances, while progressive state 
public utility commissions pushed for “demand side management” (DSM) and related customer 
conservation programs, including a broad set of retrofitting practices.  
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Utility programs like DSM suggested radically novel logics of commodity valuation and 
accumulation, ones that spoke to emerging green countercultural thinking in the late 1960s and 
1970s. Specifically, DSM proposed to depart from previous industrial ecological models by 
monetizing not only efficiency but net energy conservation – defined not on open markets but in 
an institutional structure of price approvals through public utility commissions. The new 
programs represented utility spending on efficiency programs and other load management efforts 
as formally equivalent to new energy generated from power plant construction. In other words, it 
became possible to imagine energy efficiency as a thing, and a potentially valuable thing, in a 
new way: simply another resource in utilities’ portfolios, if in a novel intangible form. Such 
unconventional and alternative energy ideas were supported by broader countercultural 
experimentation in centers like the San Francisco Bay Area, advanced through utopian social 
projects, regional policy development, and movement publications such as Stewart Brand’s 
Whole Earth Catalog (Kirk 2007). Significantly, through such projects the green counterculture 
pioneered a new technofuturist turn in US environmental thought – one powerfully shaping 
cleantech and green economic imaginaries today. Influential alternative energy advocates in this 
countercultural milieu included figures like Brand and Amory Lovins. For example, in the sphere 
of energy conservation and its nascent value experiments, Lovins proffered the notion of 
“negawatts” to sell efficiency interventions’ ability to produce an intangible but real, 
quantifiable, and potentially valuable product (Hirsh 1999). Such early visions not only 
anticipated market environmentalism’s raft of similarly intangible environmental commodities 
like tradable carbon credits and ecosystem services (Fairhead et al. 2012), but also deeper post-
industrial logics behind ecological modernization and green growth – possibilities for expansive 
spheres of intangible value and, ultimately, economic decoupling.12 
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In the contemporary moment, this revolution in valuing efficiency has arguably been most 
important for utilities’ competitors, a rising tide of capitalist entrepreneurs who have sought to 
overturn 20th century utility monopolies. These mounting transformations in the US electricity 
sector have been supported by a wave of deregulation since the 1990s (accompanied by a wave 
of similar neoliberal restructuring abroad under structural adjustment programs).13 One important 
justification for market restructuring was to create new opportunities for a specific type of 
competitor, non-utility energy efficiency businesses.14 For example, in the 1990s new energy 
service companies (ESCOs), dramatically expanding a model also originally experimented with 
in the 1970s Energy Crisis, proposed to join or fully replace utilities as providers of efficiency 
retrofits and other functions. ESCOs specifically targeted large public and institutional buildings 
and campuses, complex built environments that presented repair and modernization possibilities 
beyond weatherization’s scope - building commissioning, retrofits, project financing, and other 
services.15 ESCOs’ proposed profits typically have come from energy performance contracting, a 
specific framing of energy efficiency as a resource: they are paid out of energy costs that they 
succeed in saving clients. In addition, ESCOs also often market in-house or third party financing 
packages to cover the upfront costs of retrofits. They advertise that once these upfront costs and 
fees are recouped through subsequent reductions in energy and energy costs, building owners 
and operators will be left with years of their own valuable savings. The 2001 California Energy 
Crisis and Enron scandal, spurred by opportunistic speculation around the state’s electricity 
deregulation, soured the US ESCO market for years – not least because Enron’s Energy Services 
had helped lead this initial wave. Many private ESCOs failed or consolidated, and utilities 
shuttered versions started in-house. However, ESCOs again became big US business with the 
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rise of the green economy in the late 2000s, with a new wave of growth and major expansion 
into sectors like commercial real estate. Leading ESCOs in the US today include massive multi-
national corporations such as Siemens, Johnson Controls, Honeywell, and Schneider Electric, in 
a growing global market – $15 billion in 2017, and projected to double to $30.8 billion by 2026 
(Navigant Research 2017).  
 
In addition, Silicon Valley experiments with cleantech since late 2000s have generated a wave of 
energy efficiency start-ups, companies that now seek to seize market share from both utilities 
and larger ESCOs and “disrupt” their established business models. High-profile startups today 
such as Opower and Drift have targeted new energy efficiency markets in and beyond 
retrofitting, developing business models around new sectoral trends such as digitization, big data 
applications, device-centered behavioral energy efficiency, and demand-side “behind-the-meter” 
energy storage (a strategy to support the power grid management challenges of another 
expanding frontier of green capitalism, rapid renewable energy deployment) (e.g., Levenda et al. 
2015, Knuth 2018). Meanwhile, a related set of green investment entrepreneurs such as Renew 
Financial and Ygrene have targeted the sphere of finance for retrofitting, especially for new 
private commercial and residential sector markets. Such companies now advertise a raft of 
experimental instruments such as Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing to cover 
clients’ upfront retrofitting costs, often alongside secondary market construction practices such 
as loan bundling, on-selling, and asset-backed securitization (familiar property financing 
practices pre- and post-dating the subprime bubble). Together, such energy efficiency services 
and financing start-ups exemplify a broader Silicon Valley strategy for pushing its comparative 
advantage in a globally competitive green economy – one that disappointed aspiring US 
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cleantech manufacturers in the late 2000s (Knuth 2018). These “Cleantech 2.0” entrepreneurs 
have instead looked to software, services, and other material- and capital-light business models – 
ones seemingly ideally placed to produce intangible assets like energy efficiency as a resource. 
 
These energy efficiency as a resource schemes join a broader waste to resource project in the 
green economy. Novel efforts to revalue urban and industrial waste streams are building on 
longer-term industrial ecological projects to eliminate energy and resource inefficiencies, as well 
as more diverse legacies and geographies of industrial and municipal waste salvage.16 Like 
energy retrofitting, these efforts have recently brought capitalist repair home to industrial 
capitalist economies – for example, in new programs to recover industrial waste streams for 
mining and reprocessing. Without the geographically fixed object that retrofitting possesses in 
urban built environments, some of this (re)location has been a product of deliberate social and 
environmental policy (Gregson et al. 2016, Knapp 2016).17 Such projects are a growing concern 
within political ecology (including via its new interest in industrial ecology; Newell and Cousins 
2015, Huber 2017). Critically, as Gregson et al. (2010, 2016) argue, these waste streams’ 
intransigent materialities present major challenges to reframing them as “clean”, innovative 
accumulation frontiers. All too often, waste remains stubborn, dirty, and dangerous – particularly 
to those who labor to process it, and the spaces that house such transformations (and see Gidwani 
and Reddy 2011, Dillon 2014). As a form of waste and nascent resource, energy inefficiency 
presents a radically different and attractive (im)material profile for management and revaluation. 
Indeed, Mulvaney (2014) warns that this relative cleanliness can make energy and greenhouse 
gas emissions waste a problematic entry within industrial ecological practices like life-cycle 
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analysis, as corporations seize upon profitable eco-efficiency opportunities while obscuring more 
difficult and toxic industrial byproducts.  
 
The Search for a Green Premium: Retrofitting and Green Gentrification 
Critically, however, retrofitting projects are not creatures of energy markets alone, nor are they 
nearly as free to shed their material bases as some new sectors suggest. Rather, they depend in 
inextricable ways upon the materialities of existing urban fabrics and everyday practices, as well 
as upon cooperation from the entrenched assemblages of real estate development and valuation 
that shape these environments. How, therefore, do new projects to monetize and mine energy 
efficiency in buildings materialize on the ground, particularly within urban property markets? 
Significantly, as energy efficiency as a resource ideas have expanded today, an articulated set of 
practices is now emerging within spaces of real estate (re)development, public and private.  
 
Once again, earlier encounters with energy scarcity have been generative in this activity. Low-
income weatherization was not the only initiative for built environment repair developing in the 
United States through the 1970s, nor was it the only effort to articulate the energy and 
environmental significance of its practice. Environmentalist concerns joined a broader rising 
critique of modernist city-building, particularly the excesses of midcentury downtown 
redevelopment and Urban Renewal – rapid architectural obsolescence, large-scale demolitions 
and displacements, and the destruction of significant historical landmarks; atop farther-reaching 
processes of disinvestment and abandonment in older industrial cities (Harvey 1985, Zukin 1989, 
Cairns and Jacobs 2014, Abramson 2016). Movements for building rehabilitation, adaptive 
reuse, and historic preservation, collectively protesting the wastefulness of this ruination, 
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advanced alternative visions of urban salvage and maintenance – demands for fixity that 
paralleled the era’s broader environmental conservationist programs, and often with similar 
nostalgia and settler colonial elitism (e.g., in historic preservation’s call to protect culturally 
“significant” and “original” buildings and neighborhoods; Zukin 1989, and see Collard et al. 
2015). Amidst the Energy Crisis, these conversations advanced noteworthy – if, again, all too 
brief –  critiques of the more particular energy wastefulness of rapid urban obsolescence and 
redevelopment (Smith 1979, National Trust for Historic Preservation 2009). It bears 
remembering here that this turn to fine-grained urban repair and rehabilitation, within both 
grassroots activity and government redevelopment policy, classically defined gentrification as a 
practice – even as the term and practice subsequently expanded to encompass more diverse 
interventions like new-build redevelopment (e.g., Glass 1964, Smith 1979, Davidson and Lees 
2010). However, as gentrification entered the mainstream, its early energy concerns quickly fell 
out and were forgotten. Some of these energy and environmental roots were translated into later 
campaigns for green design in new construction – for example, through the development of the 
US Green Building Council’s (USGBC) Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) standard and rise of New Urbanist planning (Abramson 2016). Recently, these 
foundational concerns have been more explicitly excavated and resuscitated within historic 
preservation, as a new campaign to “green” preservation seeks to rearticulate and reconcile its 
project with large-scale energy retrofitting and decarbonization (National Trust for Historic 
Preservation 2009). Notably, the National Historic Trust’s new Preservation Green Lab (2012) 
has developed a dedicated program of data-gathering to support energy retrofitting. 
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The current moment is seeing a broader uptake of energy retrofitting within mainstream real 
estate development, in explicit green capitalist terms. Significantly, a wave of major commercial 
real estate developers and investors retrofitted their property portfolios in the late 2000s and 
2010s, voluntarily and via participation in new public-private decarbonization initiatives. This 
activity was aided by ESCOs’ concurrent expansion into the private commercial property sector 
and the development of dedicated real estate certification and investment tools. For example, the 
USGBC developed a new label for retrofitting projects, the LEED for Existing Buildings: 
Operations and Management (EBOM) standard, a private certification that joins existing federal 
labels like Energy Star. Knuth (2016) provides a window into the interplay – and frictions – 
between energy efficiency and more expansively defined “green” retrofitting and labeling in 
such projects. In 2006, in the early years of the LEED EBOM standard, the USGBC reported 
approximately 3.3 million square feet certified nationally, a figure dwarfed by traditional new 
green building certifications (21.6 million square feet). By 2009, annual EBOM certifications 
surged to 132.5 million square feet and remained in the hundreds of millions throughout the early 
2010s, surpassing new building certifications every year (Green Buildings Information Gateway 
2014). Meanwhile, the urban and state level energy retrofitting policies described above worked 
to promote and support this wave, via large-scale retrofitting targets and the codevelopment of 
other tools such as retrofitting financing apparatuses – including via partnerships with new green 
financial institutions.18 Many such programs also sought to expand private retrofitting in housing 
– so far more challenging than the commercial property sector (in this vein, see also federal 
programs like the Obama Administration’s Better Building Challenge and stimulus-era funding 
spikes for low-income weatherization, accompanied by new efforts to reframe weatherization 
for/as green economic development; Tonn et al. 2011, Edwards and Bulkeley 2015).  
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These new economies of repair require dedicated programs of green valuation and market 
construction, in and beyond the US urban context. Such initiatives join now-extensive public-
private campaigns to “green” (or re-green) gentrification more broadly defined, processes that 
urban political ecologists and economists are tracking in multiple forms (and see Anguelovski 
2016). Significantly, many such efforts are advancing new relationships with urban (dis)repair 
and forms of property revaluation that may be attached to it. For example, they encompass an 
expansive encounter with the unruly ecologies and disorder of urban wastes and abandoned 
infrastructures, one now animating high-profile projects of aesthetic reappraisal, post-industrial 
park development, and real estate speculation (e.g., Gandy 2013, Millington 2015). They also 
include programs of brownfield remediation and urban clean-up – longstanding grassroots efforts 
now appropriated by high-value property redevelopment (Checker 2011, Dillon 2014).19 
Scholars of green gentrification are increasingly interrogating more precisely how these various 
forms of greening may raise urban property rents and exchange values, and how developers may 
appraise and appropriate this speculative premium (Bryson 2013, Anguelovski 2016). Such 
novel revaluation strategies are joining longer-term efforts to find and exploit urban rent gaps 
and land revaluation potential (e.g., Smith 1979, Weber 2002, Slater 2017).20 Green 
gentrification projects might raise rents around new green amenities, mitigate rent impairments 
on and around dilapidated and contaminated brownfield sites, or both. As Dillon (2014) 
proposes, such revaluation exercises may transmute abject urban wastelands into wastelands in a 
classic Lockean sense: invitations to capitalist intensification and, through this “improvement”, 
private appropriation of resulting value. However, energy retrofitting’s entry into these repair 
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and revaluation frontiers is only beginning to be interrogated (although see Knuth 2016, 
Bouzarovski et al. 2018). 
 
I suggest that energy retrofitting adds both new value streams and tools to projects for 
gentrification and adaptive reuse. Drawing on today’s growing pool of buildings retrofitted and 
certified under standards like LEED EBOM and Energy Star, real estate data analysts have given 
this trend fresh fuel by declaring that certified green and energy efficient buildings have become 
demonstrably more valuable than their non-green competitors (calculations once again 
particularly established for commercial real estate, although advocates make similar claims for 
high energy performance homes) (Rydin 2016). This “green premium” reflects multiple 
valuation logics (as Knuth 2016 also argues). Notably, like past shifts around modernization and 
property obsolescence, it is in part a creature of collective market perception and fashion (and 
see Weber 2002, Abramson 2016). Green real estate is quite capable of becoming more valuable 
simply because enough developers and investors are convinced that it is (for now). Conversely, 
property owners may legitimately fear that failing to jump on a greening bandwagon risks 
properties’ future desirability to prospective tenants and investors, prompting downgrades from 
“Class A” investment status, diminished ability to attract tenants and command competitive 
rents, and, ultimately, devaluation. At the same time, energy cost savings generated through 
retrofitting projects suggest a calculable stream of value to capitalize into broader property 
exchange values and rents – a potentially less vulnerable locus of revaluation, given the 
capriciousness of urban real estate markets and ongoing ambiguities in precisely what use and 
exchange values a green premium expresses (for example, green building labels remain vague 
and problematic as a proxy for energy conservation and decarbonization potential, e.g., Knuth 
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2016). Broader energy market developments might increase this value-added. A return to high 
energy prices, effected through new scarcities or pricing greenhouse gas emissions, would 
increase the cost of energy waste and the value of efficient spaces. More recently, commercial 
property developers have begun to consider energy value-added as a new revenue source to fund 
and finance rehabilitation and adaptive reuse projects. They are adding streams of anticipated 
future value from retrofits, especially financed upfront via instruments like Commercial PACE, 
to already densely stacked value streams – from historic tax credits, transferrable air and 
development rights, low-income housing tax credits (for below market-rate rental housing units), 
and beyond. 
 
These revaluation campaigns depend upon equally dedicated efforts to render energy 
improvements visible in property records and appraisal apparatuses – articulated with parallel 
efforts to map energy problem spaces and devalue inefficient properties as impaired. Such 
initiatives have been another important project of public retrofitting programs today. For 
example, cities such as San Francisco, Seattle, Austin, and Washington, D.C. launched large-
scale energy benchmarking efforts in the 2000s and 2010s, policies designed to officially record 
and track buildings’ energy performance.21 California’s AB 802 established a similar 
benchmarking rule for commercial buildings and multifamily housing statewide. Meanwhile, in a 
different data-gathering register, entities like Preservation Green Lab are now highlighting other 
key logics for retrofitting. Using tools like life-cycle analysis, this institution is developing new 
pictures of both the energy required to operate buildings in various US regions (of various 
historical vintages) and the “embodied” energy required to build, demolish, and rebuild them 
(Preservation Growth Lab 2012). These calculations present a significant case for retrofitting and 
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maintaining existing built environments, instead of removing and replacing them with new high-
efficiency designs. They argue that older US buildings – especially those built before midcentury 
pushes for high-energy modernization and manufactured obsolescence – are unexpectedly energy 
efficient if maintained. This argument represents an important departure from conventional 
wisdom in the US context (National Trust for Historic Preservation 2009).22 Furthermore, this 
analysis maintains that new high energy performance buildings might take decades of 
operational efficiencies to recoup energy and emissions released in their construction. These 
findings raise a profound question: are today’s new retrofitting initiatives prepared to turn more 
durably to urban maintenance? 
 
 
Conclusion: Decarbonization in a Restless Urban World 
What does the first-cut survey presented here suggest about energy retrofitting as an urban repair 
program, and its possibilities for energy conservation and decarbonization? Within unfolding 
debates over planetary repair and its global economy, retrofitting is an exceptional project in 
significant ways. As it moves such practices and economies home to urban and capitalist centers, 
it presents more meaningful opportunities for reforming these spaces and their dynamics. This 
paper’s discussion suggests that political ecology should take retrofitting seriously as a practice 
of repair, one with decarbonization outcomes that might outlive backers’ current green growth 
aspirations. This is true despite legitimate concerns that energy efficiency campaigns (even 
successful ones) may not check net growth in energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions. Significantly, in targeting existing built environments for its intervention, retrofitting 
addresses crucial shaping factors in energy use and emissions, in the US context and beyond. 
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These inconspicuous yet vital materialities are insufficiently considered in many degrowth 
proposals today (e.g., D’Alisa et al. 2014): embedded energy use practices such as space heating 
and cooling may powerfully resist programs of voluntary simplicity for the comfortable, as well 
as austerity, energy scarcity, and involuntary simplicity for the energy-poor.  
 
If retrofitting illuminates more durable possibilities as a practice of repair, its economies of repair 
remain far murkier. This paper has explored multiple would-be accumulation frontiers helping 
drive US energy retrofitting today, all of which remain works in progress. In this first-cut survey, 
it is certainly possible to read would-be green capitalism as an enabling force for large-scale 
retrofitting in the United States – its expansionary growth rhetoric and technofuturist visions 
have helped the practice go mainstream in ways that invocations of scarcity and wastefulness in 
the Energy Crisis failed to do. Ways in which retrofitting, energy conservation, decarbonization, 
and accumulation might run together in the near term thus represent an unusually open question. 
In exploring some fine-grained responses to it in the value and market infrastructures surveyed 
here, this discussion suggests important takeaways and, unsurprisingly, further questions for 
political ecological and economic research. Notably, many value propositions now emerging 
here, whether around energy efficiency as a resource or green real estate revaluation, do 
seemingly depend upon translating retrofits into demonstrable energy conservation. However, 
how durable such energy savings must and will be is less clear. New green entrepreneurs might 
succeed in collecting the more immediate fees and cuts discussed, but what about the clients 
charged with maintenance of these building improvements over the long term? Green 
accumulation and growth schemes might successfully gloss over such questions, as they expand 
into built environments across the United States and frontiers beyond – indeed, non-durability 
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might simply present them new opportunities for fresh repair contracts and profits down the 
road. However, governmental decarbonization programs must take a more holistic and long-term 
view of these questions, as must critical evaluations. 
 
Ultimately, the more pertinent dilemma here may not be the durability of energy savings from 
retrofitting as a practice – potential rebound effects and growth-enabling efficiencies 
notwithstanding. Rather, it may lie in the intransigent materialities in and upon which retrofitting 
must work (in contradiction to the immaterial visions of some proponents): the durability of the 
buildings its initiatives target. As the discussion above begins to suggest, decarbonization 
imperatives encounter serious challenges in capitalist urbanization: its geographical 
“restlessness” (Harvey 1985), and how such an imperative encodes material obsolescence into its 
built environments and assemblages. To justify their new political placement and broader 
revaluation, retrofitted buildings must not only be repaired but maintained and conserved into the 
future. If not, they will sacrifice not only their new emissions-averted but shed additional energy 
and emissions in their degradation, demolition, and disposal – significantly, echoing a problem 
encountered in forest carbon offsetting and other geographies of planetary repair. In urban 
contexts, this fixation may require sacrificing the prospect of higher returns from future building 
conversion or destruction. As such, it contradicts a longstanding imperative of (and tension 
within) capitalist urbanization, one with a long legacy in US land and property infrastructures 
(e.g., Plotkin 1987): that cities and built environments should be rendered flexible to recurrent 
creative destruction in service of ongoing economic growth.  
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Expanding apparatuses of gentrification in the US “return to the city” have arguably proffered a 
distinct urban version of Fairhead et al.’s (2012) problematic economy of repair. On the one 
hand, developers exploit a growing array of tools for building rehabilitation, revaluation, and 
adaptive reuse, including the new energy and environmental ones surveyed here. These 
infrastructures join more longstanding ones – even at the height of the United States’ more 
unabashed mid-20th century enthusiasm for urban obsolescence and redevelopment, some urban 
landscapes were maintained by and for their inhabitants (Smith 1979). While capitalism may in 
theory treat all land as a financial asset and all structures upon it as therefore disposable in 
pursuit of an ever-evolving “highest and best use”, such a project has been more partial and 
contingent in actual practice (Harvey 1982, Christophers 2010, Knuth 2015) – and, moreover, 
encounters unruly materialities like brownfield contamination in challenging, undertheorized 
ways (Dillon 2014). Collectively, these activities are expanding an important program of repair 
in US urbanism, as well as new strategies to profit from it – albeit at the cost of persistent 
racialized and classed displacement.23 On the other hand, urban governments and developers 
have continued to elaborate upon a vast array of tools for urban redevelopment and land 
speculation – for writing down the value of existing buildings, foreshortening their material 
lifetimes, and otherwise facilitating their profitable removal and replacement (Weber 2002). 
More broadly, US capitalism and urbanism remain bound in conjoined geographies of regional 
boom and bust, growth and decline, and speculation and disinvestment – accompanied today by 
fresh programs of demolition within shrinking cities. The new gentrification wave has 
successfully rolled out amidst this broader volatility and urban wasting. However, to fulfill their 
promise(s) for decarbonization, energy retrofitting initiatives require a far tougher confrontation 






Abramson D (2016) Obsolescence: An Architectural History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Anguelovski I (2016) From toxic sites to parks as (green) LULUs? New challenges of inequity, privilege, 
gentrification, and exclusion for urban environmental justice. Journal of Planning Literature 31(1): 
23–36. 
Bennett J (2009) Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Berry L, Brown M, and Kinney L (1997) Progress Report of the National Weatherization Assistance 
Program, ORNL/CON-450. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
Bouzarovski S, Frankowski J and Tirado Herrero S (2016) Low-carbon gentrification: When climate 
change encounters residential displacement. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 
Forthcoming. 
Brand S (1995) How Buildings Learn: What Happens After They're Built. New York: Penguin. 
Bryson J (2013) The nature of gentrification. Geography Compass 7(8): 578–587.  
Cairns S and Jacobs JM (2014). Buildings Must Die: A Perverse View of Architecture. Boston: MIT 
Press. 
Checker M (2011) Wiped out by the ‘greenwave’: Environmental gentrification and the paradoxical 
politics of urban sustainability. City & Society 23(2): 210–229. 
Christophers B (2010) On voodoo economics: Theorising relations of property, value and contemporary 
capitalism. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 35(1): 94-108. 
Christophers B (2018) Risk capital: Urban political ecology and entanglements of financial and 
environmental risk in Washington, DC. Environment and Planning E. Forthcoming. 
 
	 29	
Cohen DA (2017) The other low-carbon protagonists: Poor people’s movements and climate politics in 
São Paulo. From The City is the Factory: New Solidarities and Spatial Strategies in an Urban Age. 
Greenberg M and Lewis P, Eds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 140-157. 
Collard R, Dempsey J, and Sundberg J (2015) A manifesto for abundant futures. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 105(2): 322–330. 
D'Alisa G, Demaria F and Kallis G, Eds. (2014) Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era. New York: 
Routledge. 
Davidson M and Lees L (2010) New-build gentrification: Its histories, trajectories, and critical 
geographies. Population, Space and Place 16(5): 395-411. 
Day Biehler D and Simon G (2011) The Great Indoors: Research frontiers on indoor environments as 
active political-ecological spaces. Progress in Human Geography 35(2): 172-192. 
Derickson KD (2018) Urban geography III: Anthropocene urbanism. Progress in Human Geography 
42(3): 425-435.  
Dillon L (2014) Race, waste, and space: Brownfield redevelopment and environmental justice at the 
Hunters Point Shipyard. Antipode 46(5): 1205–1221. 
Edwards G and Bulkeley H (2015) Urban political ecologies of housing and climate change: The ‘Coolest 
Block’ contest in Philadelphia. Urban Studies. Forthcoming.  
DOE (2008) Energy Efficiency Trends in Residential and Commercial Buildings. Washington, DC: US 
DOE. 
Fairhead J, Leach M and Scoones I (2012) Green grabbing: A new appropriation of nature? Journal of 
Peasant Studies 39(2): 237–261. 
Gandy M (2013) Marginalia: Aesthetics, ecology, and urban wastelands. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 103(6): 1301–1316.  
Gidwani V and Reddy R (2011) The afterlives of “waste”: Notes from India for a minor history of 
capitalist surplus. Antipode 43(5): 1625–1658. 
Gieryn T (2002) What buildings do. Theory and society 31(1): 35-74. 
	 30	
Glass R (1964) Introduction: Aspects of change. In Centre for Urban Studies, Ed. Aspects of Change. 
London: MacGibbon and Kee, pp. pp. xiii–xlii. 
Goldstein JE (2014) The afterlives of degraded tropical forests: New value for conservation and 
development. Environment and Society: Advances in Research 5(1): 124–140. 
Graham S and Thrift N (2007) Out of order: Understanding repair and maintenance. Theory, Culture & 
Society 24(3): 1-25. 
Green Buildings Information Gateway (2014) Places: United States. http://www. gbig.org/places/935 (last 
accessed 7 October 2015). 
Gregson N, Watkins H and Calestani M (2010) Inextinguishable fibres: Demolition and the vital 
materialisms of asbestos. Environment and Planning A 42(5): 1065-1083. 
Gregson N, Crang M, Botticello J, Calestani M and Krzywoszynska A (2016) Doing the ‘dirty work’ of 
the green economy: Resource recovery and migrant labour in the EU. European Urban and Regional 
Studies 23(4): 541–555. 
Harrison C and Popke J (2011) “Because you got to have heat”: The networked assemblage of energy 
poverty in Eastern North Carolina. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101(4): 949-
961. 
Harvey D (1982) The Limits to Capital. New York: Verso. 
Harvey D (1985) The Urbanization of Capital. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Hirsh R (1999) Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electric 
Utility System. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Hise G (1999) Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth-Century Metropolis. Baltimore: JHU Press. 
Hodson M, Burrai E, and Barlow C (2016) Remaking the material fabric of the city: ‘Alternative’ low 
carbon spaces of transformation or continuity? Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 
18: 128–146. 
Hodson M and Marvin S, Eds. (2015) Retrofitting Cities: Priorities, Governance and Experimentation. 
New York: Routledge. 
	 31	
Hommels A (2005) Studying obduracy in the city: Toward a productive fusion between technology 
studies and urban studies. Science, Technology, & Human Values 30(3): 323-351. 
Huber, M (2013) Lifeblood: Oil, Freedom, and the Forces of Capital. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Huber M (2017) Hidden abodes: Industrializing political ecology. Annals of the American Association of 
Geographers 107(1): 151–166. 
Kenney-Lazar M and Kay K (2017) Value in capitalist natures. Capitalism Nature Socialism 28(1): 33-
38. 
Kinder K (2016) DIY Detroit: Making Do in a City Without Services. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Kirk A (2007) Counterculture Green: The Whole Earth Catalog and American Environmentalism. 
Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. 
Knapp F (2016) The birth of the flexible mine: Changing geographies of mining and the e-waste 
commodity frontier. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 48(10): 1889-1909. 
Knuth S (2015). Global finance and the land grab: Mapping twenty-first century strategies. Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies 36(2): 163-178. 
Knuth S (2016) Seeing green in San Francisco: City as resource frontier. Antipode 48(3): 626–644. 
Knuth S (2017) Green devaluation: Disruption, divestment, and decommodification for a green economy. 
Capitalism Nature Socialism 28(1): 98–117. 
Knuth S (2018) “Breakthroughs” for a green economy? Financialization and clean energy 
transition. Energy Research & Social Science. Forthcoming. 
Latour B (2011) Love your monsters. Breakthrough Journal 2(11): 21-28. 
Levenda A, Mahmoudi D and Sussman G (2015) The neoliberal politics of ‘smart’: Electricity 
consumption, household monitoring, and the enterprise form. Canadian Journal of Communication 
40(4): 615–636. 
Long J and Rice J (2018) From sustainable urbanism to climate urbanism. Urban Studies. Forthcoming. 
	 32	
Mansfield B and Doyle M (2017). Nature: A conversation in three parts. Annals of the American 
Association of Geographers 107(1): 22-27. 
McFarlane C (2011) Assemblage and critical urbanism. City 15(2): 204-224. 
Millington N (2015) From urban scar to ‘park in the sky’: Terrain vague, urban design, and the remaking 
of New York City’s High Line Park. Environment and Planning A 47(11): 2324-2338. 
Mulvaney D (2014) Are green jobs just jobs? Cadmium narratives in the life cycle of Photovoltaics. 
Geoforum 54: 178–186. 
National Trust for Historic Preservation (2009) Forum Journal: Positioning Preservation in a Green 
World. 23.3. 
Navigant Research (2017) ESCO Market Overview 
Newell J and Cousins J (2015) The boundaries of urban metabolism: Towards a political-industrial 
ecology. Progress in Human Geography 39(6): 702-728. 
Nye D (1992) Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press 
Plotkin S (1987). Property, policy and politics: Towards a theory of urban land-use conflict. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 11(3): 382-404. 
Preservation Green Lab (2012) The Greenest Building: Quantifying the Environmental Value of Building 
Reuse. The National Trust for Historic Preservation. 
Robbins P and Moore S (2013) Ecological anxiety disorder: Diagnosing the politics of the Anthropocene. 
Cultural Geographies 20.1: 3–19. 
Romero A (2016) From oil well to farm: Industrial waste, Shell Oil, and the petrochemical turn (1927-
1947). Agricultural History 90(1): 70–93. 
Rydin Y (2016) Sustainability and the financialisation of commercial property: Making prime and non-
prime markets. Environment and Planning D 34(4): 745–762. 
Shove E (2003) Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: The Social Organization of Normality. New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing 
	 33	
Silver J (2015) Disrupted infrastructures: An urban political ecology of interrupted electricity in 
Accra. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 39(5): 984-1003. 
Slater T (2017) Planetary rent gaps. Antipode 49: 114-137. 
Smith N (1979) Toward a theory of gentrification: A back to the city movement by capital, not 
people. Journal of the American Planning Association 45(4): 538-548. 
Tobey R (1996). Technology as Freedom: The New Deal and the Electrical Modernization of the 
American home. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Tonn B, Rose E, Schmoyer R, Eisenberg J, Ternes M, Schweitzer M, and Hendrick T (2011) Evaluation 
of the National Weatherization Assistance Program during Program Years 2009-2011 (American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act Period), ORNL/TM-2011/87. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. 
Tsing AL (2015) The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Turner F (2006) From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the 
Rise of Digital Utopianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wachsmuth D and Angelo H (2018) Green and gray: New ideologies of nature in urban sustainability 
policy. Annals of the American Association of Geographers 108.4: 1038–1056. 
Walker R and Large D (1974) The economics of energy extravagance. Ecology LQ 4: 963. 
Weber R (2002) Extracting value from the city: Neoliberalism and urban redevelopment. Antipode 34(3): 
519–540. 
Zukin S (1989) Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press. 
1 With variable promises, timelines, and metrics (e.g., per building, square foot, or across a whole 
building stock). 
2 Including exploitable spaces close to home, as protested in environmental/climate justice activism. 
3 Particularly in the energy/decarbonization realm I consider here. 
4 Despite metaphorical allusions to urban “gardens”, and an expansive debate on planetary urbanization, a 




5 Although see its explorations of disrepair in urban infrastructures in the Global South, including for 
electricity (e.g., McFarlane 2011, Silver 2016). See also Kinder (2016) on DIY repair practices in Detroit 
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18 For example, Rahm Emmanuel’s ambitious plans (mostly thwarted) to use his new Infrastructure Trust 
to finance hundreds of millions of dollars in Chicago energy efficiency retrofits. Similarly, Renew 
Financial, mentioned above, was originally developed out of the City of Berkeley’s retrofitting financing 
experiments, including the birth of the PACE model.  
19 As well as new forms of financialized extraction – see Christophers (2018) on green infrastructure 
repair/replacement and experimental bond financing. 
20 Particularly complex revaluation projects when urban land’s real estate “improvements” and 
impairments are retained or unsuccessfully rendered invisible – departures from the aspirational 
sweeping-clean of pure locational land revaluation. 
21 For example, in 2013 the City of San Francisco required all existing large commercial buildings in the 
city to conduct yearly performance benchmarking and half-decadal comprehensive energy audits. 
Similarly, citing green revaluation objectives, the city’s Office of the Assessor-Recorder now enters 
buildings’ energy and environmental performance labels in its land records. 
22 Such calls also critique how green labels like LEED can value buildings’ component parts – fuel for 
waste to resource revaluation – over buildings as preserved structures. 
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23 Injustice which energy retrofitting may deepen in unanticipated ways – see, for example, its 
contributing role in London’s 2017 Grenfell Tower disaster.		
